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It is well recognized that loan syndication generates a moral hazard problem by 
diluting the lead arranger’s incentive to monitor the borrower. This paper pro-
poses and tests a novel view that reciprocal arrangements among lead arrang-
ers serve as an effective mechanism to mitigate this agency problem. Lender 
arrangements in about seven out of ten syndicated loans are reciprocal in the 
sense that lead arrangers also participate in loans that are led by their participant 
lenders. I develop a model in which syndicate lenders share reciprocity through 
such arrangements in a repeated-game setting as monitoring effort enhances lead 
arrangers’ ability to proﬁ  t from participating in loans led by others. The model 
generates speciﬁ  c predictions that I then confront with the data. I ﬁ  nd strong and 
consistent empirical evidence on the reciprocity effect. Controlling for lender, 
borrower, and loan characteristics, I show that: (i) lead arrangers retain on aver-
age 4.3% less of the loans with reciprocity than those without reciprocity, (ii) 
the average interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds is 11 basis points lower 
on loans with reciprocity, and (iii) the default probability is 4.7% lower among 
loans with reciprocity. These results indicate a cooperative equilibrium in loan 
syndication and have important implications to lending institutions, borrowing 
ﬁ  rms, and regulators.
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The syndicated loan market has experienced tremendous growth and become an increasingly
important source of corporate ￿nance since the early 1990s.1 Based on the loan origination
data from DealScan, the amount of newly originated syndicated loans in the U.S. increased
six times from about $240 billion in 1992 to over $1.7 trillion in 2006. It is equivalent to a
compound annual growth rate of 15% during these 15 years.
In spite of its rising importance and many bene￿ts to both lenders and borrowers,2
syndicated lending presents an inherent moral hazard problem that lies in the very nature
of syndication. A syndicated loan is a credit facility that two or more lending institutions
jointly agree to provide to a borrowing ￿rm. A syndicate consists of two groups of members:
lead arranger(s) and participant lenders. In its typical role as the borrower￿ s relationship
bank, the lead arranger forms the syndicate and acts as the managing agent for the group
of lenders. Its main responsibilities include monitoring the borrower,3 distributing interests
and principal repayments, enforcing ￿nancial covenants, etc. On the other hand, the role
of participant lenders is mainly funding part of the loan.
Based on Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), moral hazard exists
in this market because: (i) the lead arranger is the informed lender, whereas participant
lenders are usually less informed, (ii) the lead arranger￿ s due diligence and monitoring e⁄ort
is costly but often unobservable, and (iii) syndication leads to a smaller stake in the loan
for the lead arranger, which dilutes its incentive to monitor the borrower.4
These issues suggest that opportunistic behavior by lead arrangers should be common-
place and moral hazard induced by syndication may be so severe as to jeopardize the value
of the intermediation service. There has, however, been little empirical evidence on this.
Simon (1993) shows that a larger portion of quality loans are syndicated, Panyagometh and
Roberts (2002) conclude that agency problems do not prevail in loan syndication, and Su￿
(2007) states that default rates in the syndicated loan market are indeed quite low. This
presents us with an interesting conundrum: How does the syndicated loan market overcome
the obvious moral hazard problem of opportunistic behavior by lead arrangers?
Two explanations have been o⁄ered thus far. One is that incentive mechanisms to cope
with moral hazard are put in place by virtue of the lead arranger retaining a larger share
of a loan that presents more severe information asymmetry and/or requires more intense
1Among others, Armstrong (2003), Gadanecz (2004), and Rhodes (2000) are excellent references for the
history and current condition of the syndicated loan market.
2For example, syndication diversi￿es risk in lenders￿loan portfolios by lowering risk exposure to indi-
vidual borrowers. Syndicating a portion of the loan may be necessary when the lead arranger faces capital
constraints or binding regulatory requirements such as minimum capital-asset ratio and maximum size of
any single loan to a bank￿ s equity capital.
3Monitoring responsibilities are typically delegated to the lead arranger in the sense of Diamond (1984).
4A paper in which there are multiple lenders who bene￿t from each other￿ s monitoring/screening e⁄orts
is Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984). In that paper, the free-riding problem is resolved by assuming that
these lenders are all part of the same intermediary and hence can monitor each other.
1monitoring and due diligence. Empirical evidence appears to support this hypothesis [e.g.,
Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Jones, Lang and Nigro (2005), and Su￿ (2007)]. Another
explanation is that reputation concerns of the lead arranger mitigate the agency problems
in loan syndication [e.g., Diamond (1991) and Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993)]. Dennis
and Mullineaux (2000) show that a loan is more likely to be syndicated as the lead arranger
becomes more reputable. Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2007) further show that the lead
arranger su⁄ers a loss of reputation following borrower bankruptcy. Su￿ (2007) ￿nds that
reputation mitigates, but does not completely eliminate, agency problems. Some aspects
of the syndicated loan market, however, cannot be explained by the existing theories, even
combined. For example, while the theories predict that a less reputable lead arranger is
unable to syndicate a large amount of a loan that is lent to an informationally opaque
￿rm, there exist a signi￿cant number of syndicated loans showing just the opposite. Such
unresolved puzzles call for a third explanation.
I provide in this paper a novel view on how the moral hazard problem is mitigated in loan
syndication. It starts with some interesting observations about the data pertaining to the
syndicated loan market. First, many lenders are engaged in both leading and participating
in syndicated loans. In the U.S. market, 77% of lead arrangers are also participants of some
other loans. Second, the largest lead arrangers are typically the largest participant lenders.
For example, JPMorganChase is both the Number 1 lead arranger and the Number 3
participant lender in the U.S. market during 2004-2006. Meanwhile, seven of the ten largest
lead arrangers are also among the ten largest participant lenders. Third, it is a common
practice for lenders to maintain stable relationships with certain other lenders and rotate
their roles between leading and participating within the group. Consider, for example, the
relationship between the two largest lead arrangers. During 2004-2006, Bank of America
participated in 1,133 syndicated loan facilities (39%) that were arranged by JPMorganChase
as a sole lead in the U.S. market. At the same time, JPMorganChase participated in 875 loan
facilities (28%) that were arranged solely by Bank of America.5 Thus, lender arrangements
in loan syndication are reciprocal in the sense that lead arrangers often participate in loans
that are led by their participant lenders.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that such reciprocal arrangements serve as
an e⁄ective mechanism to mitigate moral hazard in the syndicated loan market by providing
lead arrangers additional incentive to monitor borrowers through loan participation. I call
this e⁄ect the "reciprocity" e⁄ect in loan syndication as lead arrangers mutually bene￿t
from each another￿ s monitoring e⁄ort and improve Pareto e¢ ciency.6
5See Tables 1 and 2 for detailed statistics.
6Another agency problem loan syndication presents is adverse selection. That is, lead arrangers have the
incentive to syndicate loans that are of inferior quality while keeping the good loans to themselves. Although
the focus of this paper is on moral hazard, the rationale behind the mitigation of moral hazard by reciprocal
arrangements can be similarly applied to reducing adverse selection.
2The ￿rst part of the paper develops the theory. The model assumes two banks in an
in￿nitely repeated game, each leading a loan and participating in the loan led by the other
in every period. This reciprocal participation allows both banks to free-ride on each other￿ s
origination expertise and monitoring e⁄ort and enjoy the rents from relationship lending on
both loans as long as they both monitor their respective borrowers as the lead arrangers. The
key to the cooperative equilibrium is the threat of not inviting a lead arranger whose loan
previously failed. The lead arrangers infer each other￿ s monitoring e⁄ort by observing the
outcomes of the loans. This lends credibility to the threat faced by each lead arranger that
it will not be invited to participate in a future syndicate led by its participant lender in case
the present loan defaults, and thereby results in an equilibrium in which the lead arranger
always monitors. The model generates speci￿c predictions on syndicate structure, loan
pricing, and default probability. That is, the moral hazard problem is reduced among loans
whose lead arrangers share reciprocity with one or more participant lenders; this reduced
moral hazard results in: (i) a smaller share of the loan retained by the lead arranger, (ii) a
lower interest rate charged to the borrower, and (iii) a lower probability of loan default.
The second part of the paper then empirically tests these predictions. Using the loan
information available from DealScan, I construct a sample of 46,448 syndicated loan facilities
made to non-￿nancial U.S. ￿rms between 1992 and April 2007. A syndicated loan is de￿ned
as "having reciprocity" if its lead arranger and at least one of the participant lenders switch
their roles as lead and participant in another syndicated loan. I further de￿ne di⁄erent
forms of reciprocity, i.e., current, past, and future reciprocity, based on how the periods
of two loans that share reciprocity overlap. Four measures of reciprocity are designed to
examine the existence, breadth, depth, and length of reciprocity at the syndicated loan
facility level. Moreover, in order to show that reciprocity matters to the structure of the
syndicate as well as the design of the loan contract, I di⁄erentiate reciprocity that is in
existence at the time of origination (ex ante only) from reciprocity that is observed over the
entire sample period (both ex ante and ex post). These empirical measures of reciprocity
are novel additions to the literature. About seven out of ten (71%) syndicated loan facilities
in my sample present current reciprocity at origination, abbreviated as "reciprocity."
With the data and reciprocity measures described above, I ￿nd strong and consistent
empirical evidence on the reciprocity e⁄ect. Controlling for lender, borrower, and loan
characteristics, I show that: (i) lead arrangers retain on average 4.3% less of the loans
with reciprocity than those without reciprocity, (ii) the average interest spread over LIBOR
on drawn funds is 11 basis points lower on loans with reciprocity, and (iii) the default
probability is 4.7% lower among loans with reciprocity. These results are both statistically
and economically signi￿cant. For example, the average share of the loan retained by the
lead arranger is 29.5%, so a share that is 4.3% less is a reduction of 15%; with an average
loan amount of $217 million, this implies that funds of $9 million per syndicated loan can
3be freed up for the lead arranger if it shares reciprocity with one of the participant lenders.
Similarly, reciprocity means that loans are on average charged a 5% lower interest spread
and have a 52% lower chance of default. Furthermore, I ￿nd that the greater the magnitude
of reciprocity, the stronger the e⁄ect.
One may argue that the reciprocity e⁄ect is mostly an e⁄ect of some borrower, loan,
and lead arranger characteristics since reciprocity is more likely to exist if the borrower
is larger or more informationally transparent, if the loan amount is greater, or if the lead
arranger and/or the borrower have better reputation. To address this endogeneity problem,
other than having control variables and various ￿xed e⁄ects in the regressions, I exam-
ine the interaction terms of reciprocity and information asymmetry, borrower size, loan
size, and lead arranger and borrower reputation. I ￿nd that the reciprocity e⁄ect persists
even for informationally opaque borrowers, smaller borrowers, smaller loans, less reputable
lead arrangers, and less reputable borrowers. Meanwhile, the results are robust to various
reciprocity and information asymmetry measures.
However, this is not to say that reciprocity is a stand-alone mechanism for overcoming
moral hazard, independent of the incentive and reputation e⁄ects. On the contrary, it
complements both e⁄ects. First, the incentive e⁄ect requires that the lead arranger hold
a su¢ ciently high stake of the loan itself to assure participant lenders that it will monitor
the borrower. Reciprocity enhances this e⁄ect in that the share of pro￿ts the lead arranger
expects to receive from being invited to participate in loans led by its participants generates
a propensity to monitor that works in concert with the incentive e⁄ect. Thus, the model
predicts that the lead arranger needs to retain a smaller fraction of the loan with reciprocity
than without, which is precisely what my empirical results reveal.
Second, the reputation e⁄ect implies that only reputable lead arrangers with good track
records are able to form future syndicates while others lose market shares in the long run.
In the presence of reciprocity, the lead arranger￿ s reputation a⁄ects not only the number or
amount of loans it is able to lead but also the business it receives as a participant lender. To
put it di⁄erently, the punishment in the reputation e⁄ect is the inability to lead, whereas the
punishment in the reciprocity e⁄ect is the inability to participate. Meanwhile, reciprocity
makes it possible for lenders with lesser reputation to retain smaller shares of the loans and
charge lower interest spreads to the borrowers.
This paper is related to both the theoretical and empirical strands of the growing litera-
ture on loan syndication. Focusing on the rationale for loan syndication, theoretical papers
include Wilson (1968), Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), and Pichler and Wilhelm (2001). The
main results in this literature are that syndicates are formed for risk-sharing reasons and
to circumvent regulations regarding bank capital requirements and lending limits.7
7Recently, TykvovÆ (2007) has analyzed the role of reputation in the syndication dynamics, i.e., the
know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn.
4Empirical studies on syndicated loans have examined the determinants of the ownership
structure of the syndicate. The main questions addressed are how information asymme-
try a⁄ects syndicate structure and what role lead arranger and borrower reputation plays
in syndication decisions. Examples are Simons (1993), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000),
Panyagometh and Roberts (2002), Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Jones, Lang and Nigro
(2005), Su￿ (2007), Fran￿ois and Missonier-Piera (2007), and Gopalan, Nanda and Yer-
ramilli (2007).8,9 Empirical papers on the pricing of syndicated loans are fewer. Examples
are Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008), Gupta, Singh and Zebedee (2008), and Ivashina
(2009).10 In contrast to this literature, I not only examine both syndicate structure and
loan pricing but also show how reciprocity reduces the probability of borrower default.
There are other lines of research on syndicated loans. For example, Nandy and Shao
(2007) examine institutional investors that have recently arrived in this market. Boehmer
and Megginson (1990), Esty (2001), Esty and Megginson (2003), Nini (2004), and Qian
and Strahan (2007) focus on how the global syndicated loan markets function, in particular
those in emerging economies.
This paper is also related to the literature on syndicate structure in venture capital
and securities underwriting markets [e.g., Melnik and Plaut (1996), Song (2004), Corwin
and Schultz (2005), and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007)]. In spite of the unique
characteristics of relationship lending and bank monitoring that are part of the model
developed in this paper, the results here are broadly consistent with the view that reciprocity
strengthens network e⁄ects. Meanwhile, there may exist a similar reciprocity e⁄ect in
syndicates of other ￿nancial markets. The measures of and the tests on reciprocity developed
in this paper provide some guidelines for exploring this.
There is also a literature on reciprocity [e.g., Gouldner (1960), Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe (1995), Fehr, G￿chter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr
and G￿chter (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)]. However, the reciprocity analyzed
here is subtly di⁄erent. While reciprocity in the literature is an in-kind response to bene￿cial
or harmful acts and does not depend on material rewards, reciprocity in this paper is induced
by self-interest due to higher expected payo⁄s from cooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I analyze the reciprocity e⁄ect
from the theoretical viewpoint. Empirical implementation is summarized in Section 3 with
discussions on data employed, summary statistics, and measures of reciprocity. Section 4
examines empirical results in detail on the role of reciprocity. I conclude in Section 5 with
implications of the results to lending institutions, borrowing ￿rms, and regulators.
8A recent addition to this strand of literature is Gatev and Strahan (2008) in which the e⁄ect of liquidity
risk management considerations on syndicate structure is studied.
9Mora and Sowerbutts (2008) provide an alternative perspective that the lead arranger￿ s monitoring
e⁄ort, as re￿ ected in its syndicate lending stake, matters to the borrower￿ s long-run performance.
10Another paper related to syndicated loan pricing is Saunders and Ste⁄en (2009). They evaluate the cost
of being private by examining syndicated loan pricing for private versus comparable public ￿rms.
52 Reciprocity: A Theoretical Analysis
This section develops the theory of reciprocity in syndicated lending.
I show that lead arrangers￿participation in one another￿ s loans can provide su¢ cient
incentive for them to monitor their own loans and hence improve the Pareto e¢ ciency of
the equilibrium. The threat of not inviting a lead arranger whose loan previously failed is
key to the result: lead arrangers must exert e⁄ort to monitor borrowers in order to improve
their probabilities of receiving a share of pro￿ts from loans led by others. A number of
empirical predictions are derived on the relationship between reciprocity and moral hazard.
2.1 Model Setup
I model loan syndication as an in￿nitely repeated game in which all players are risk neutral
and the discount factor is ￿ 2 (0;1].
Suppose that in each period, there exist two ￿rms, Firm A and Firm B, that live only
for that period. Both ￿rms have access to a project that requires capital $1 at the beginning
of the period and produces at the end of the period a payo⁄of Z > 0 if the project succeeds
and 0 if it fails. Neither ￿rm has any endowment and hence needs to borrow the entire
amount of the initial investment $1. If a ￿rm exerts e⁄ort, the project is a safe one, i.e.,
it produces Z with probability one. However, if a ￿rm shirks, the project becomes risky,
producing a payo⁄ of Z with probability p 2 (0;1) and 0 otherwise. Assume that each
￿rm enjoys a private bene￿t v if it shirks and v > (1 ￿ p)Z. Thus, both ￿rms shirk after
borrowing if not monitored.
Let Bank A be the relationship bank for Firm A and Bank B be the relationship bank
for Firm B in every period. In contrast to ￿rms￿one-period short lives, banks can live
in￿nitely long.
The risk-free rate of return is rf and the market-required return for relationship lend-
ing is rm > rf for one period. The gross returns from investing in risk-free assets and
relationship lending are then written as Rf = 1 + rf and Rm = 1 + rm, respectively.
In order to fund the investments for both ￿rms, two syndicated loans are created: Bank
A leads the loan to Firm A and participates in the loan to Firm B, whereas Bank B leads
the loan to Firm B and participates in the loan to Firm A. That is, Bank A and Bank
B reverse their roles in these two loans ￿I call this a reciprocal arrangement, and the two
lead arrangers exhibit reciprocity through this arrangement as they each receive a share of
pro￿ts from the other￿ s loan. Suppose that for Bank A and Bank B, the share of the loan
they each retain as a lead arranger is ￿ ￿ 0 and the share they are given as a participant
lender is ￿ > 0. Assume ￿+￿ ￿ 1 and the remaining share of each syndicated loan 1￿￿￿￿
is taken by other banks that do not lead in any syndicated loans.11
11Banks that do not lead in any syndicated loans are not of interest of this paper.
6Bank monitoring and proprietary information generation are at the heart of relationship
lending and justify the above-risk-free-return rent rm [e.g., Allen (1990), Rajan (1992), Boot
and Thakor (2000), and Boot (2000)]. It is assumed that if the lead arranger monitors the
borrowing ￿rm, the ￿rm exerts e⁄ort on the project and hence produces Z with certainty. On
the other hand, if the lead arranger does not monitor, the ￿rm always shirks and produces
Z with probability p. Thus, bank monitoring creates value.12 Meanwhile, monitoring incurs
a cost m > 0 to the lead arranger.
Let the interest rate charged on both loans be r. Both the lead share ￿ and the in-
terest rate r are assumed exogenous for now and will become endogenous when empirical
predictions are discussed.
The following assumptions are made regarding the parameter values.
￿ Assumption 1: Rf ￿ pZ < Rm ￿ Z.
￿ Assumption 2: m > (1 ￿ p)￿(1 + r).
￿ Assumption 3: m < (1 ￿ p)(￿ + ￿)(1 + r).
The implications of Assumption 1 are two-fold. First, the project does not produce a
payo⁄ high enough to repay the lenders Rm if the borrower is not monitored. That is, the
lead arranger must monitor in order to earn the rent for the entire syndicate. Second, the
NPV of the project is not negative even without monitoring, which justi￿es the making
of the loan in any situations. Assumption 2 can be rearranged to show that ￿(1 + r) ￿
m < p￿(1 + r), which indicates that with only ￿ share of its own loan, the lead arranger
has no incentive to monitor. Similarly, Assumption 3 can be rearranged to show that
(￿ + ￿)(1 + r)￿m > p(￿ + ￿)(1 + r), which says that with ￿ share of the loans they lead
and ￿ share of the loans they participate in, it is better for both banks to monitor than to
not monitor.
2.2 Stage Game
In each period, both Bank A and Bank B need to decide (1) whether to invite the other
bank by o⁄ering ￿ share of the loans they lead, and (2) whether to monitor the borrowers
of the loans they lead. In this subsection, I analyze lead arrangers￿optimal strategy in the
stage game supposing that ￿ > 0 is ￿xed and already given so that the strategy set for both
banks is fmonitor, not monitorg.
Let Ri (si;sj) be the return to Bank i given (si;sj), where i;j 2 fA;Bg, i 6= j, and
si;sj 2 fmonitor, not monitorg.
I compute the following payo⁄s contingent on both banks￿strategies:
12Bank monitoring includes both the ex post cash ￿ ow veri￿cation and the interim quality screening [e.g.,
Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998)].
71. Ri (monitor, monitor) = (￿ + ￿)(1 + r) ￿ m ￿ R￿. This is the cooperative outcome
if both banks monitor.
2. Ri (monitor, not monitor) = (￿ + p￿)(1 + r) ￿ m = R￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿ (1 + r). Let l ￿
(1 ￿ p)￿ (1 + r), then Ri (monitor, not monitor) = R￿ ￿ l < R￿. Here, l is the loss
due to the other bank￿ s deviation from monitoring.
3. Ri (not monitor, monitor) = (p￿ + ￿)(1 + r) = R￿ + [m ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿(1 + r)]. Let b ￿
m￿(1 ￿ p)￿(1 + r). Due to Assumption 2, b > 0. Hence, Ri (not monitor, monitor) =
R￿ + b > R￿. Here, b is the gain from the bank￿ s own deviation from monitoring.
4. Ri (not monitor, not monitor) = p(￿ + ￿)(1 + r) = R￿ + b ￿ l. Due to Assumption
3, b < l. Hence, Ri (not monitor, not monitor) < R￿.
The payo⁄ matrix of this stage game is summarized as follows:
Bank B
Monitor Not Monitor
Bank A Monitor (R￿;R￿) (R￿ ￿ l;R￿ + b)
Not Monitor (R￿ + b;R￿ ￿ l) (R￿ + b ￿ l;R￿ + b ￿ l)
Based on the payo⁄ matrix, it is straightforward to show that the unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in this stage game is (not monitor, not monitor). That is, neither lead
arranger monitors its borrower. This is de facto a prisoner￿ s dilemma game. Meanwhile,
there does not exist any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, both banks would be better o⁄ if (monitor, monitor) is played since R￿ > R￿ +
b ￿ l. However, both banks also have the incentive to deviate unilaterally from monitoring
in the one-shot or even ￿nitely repeated game.13
2.3 In￿nite Horizon
Now, the question is whether it is possible to improve the equilibrium to (monitor, monitor)
by going beyond a one-shot game. I show below that it can be achieved if the stage game
is repeated in￿nitely and the next-period reciprocity is o⁄ered contingent on the project
success in the current period. That is, future reciprocity can provide su¢ cient incentive for
lead arrangers to monitor.
I assume that the outcome of the loan (success or failure) in the previous period does not
a⁄ect its lead arranger￿ s business of leading loans in the future. That is, Bank A and Bank
B are able to lead their respective loans in every period regardless of the past performance
13In the ￿nitely repeated game, (monitor, monitor) is not subgame perfect because both banks will deviate
from monitoring in the last subgame.
8of the loans they led. This assumption distinguishes the e⁄ect of reciprocity predicted by
the model from the e⁄ect of reputation established in the literature.14
Now, consider the following trigger strategy for each bank to decide whether to o⁄er the
participation share ￿ > 0 to the other bank:
￿ When t = 0, Bank i o⁄ers ￿ share of the loan it leads to Bank j.
￿ When t ￿ 1, Bank i continues to o⁄er ￿ share of the loan it leads to Bank j as long as
the outcome of the loan Bank j leads is "success" from the previous period; otherwise,
it never invites Bank j to participate in the loan it leads again, i.e., the participation
share for Bank j becomes zero forever.15
The punishment in the trigger strategy is considered "fair." With the model setup,
project failure does not always happen when the lead arranger shirks on monitoring; but
when it happens, it sends a perfect signal that the lead arranger did not monitor. Fur-
thermore, Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2007) ￿nd that a large number of borrower
bankruptcies lead to a signi￿cant decline in the number of loans the lead arranger is invited
to participate in. This shows empirically the validity of such a punishment.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Given the reciprocal arrangement (￿ > 0)
and the trigger strategy, (monitor, monitor) in each period is a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium for this in￿nitely repeated game of loan syndication depicted above if the participation
share ￿ is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,











Proposition 1 says that the reciprocal arrangement can solve lead arrangers￿moral haz-
ard problem in loan syndication. The intuition behind it is as follows. When given a piece
of the syndicated loan one of its participants leads, the lead arranger obtains a share of the
pro￿ts rm by free-riding on this other lead arranger￿ s monitoring e⁄ort. As a return, it must
allow this other lead arranger (who is also one of the participants of the loan it leads) to
free-ride on its own monitoring e⁄ort and provide the pro￿ts rm to the entire syndicate. In
the ￿nitely repeated game, the lead arranger always has the incentive to shirk in the ￿nal
stage. However, when the lead arranger is given a su¢ ciently high participation share on an
14The implication of the reputation e⁄ect is that a lead arranger will no longer be able to lead loans if
the loan it leads fails, whereas the implication of the reciprocity e⁄ect is that it will no longer be able to
participate in others￿loans following the failure of the loan.
15The ￿ share of the loan, if not given to Bank j, will be o⁄ered to other banks who may or may not lead
any loans. Meanwhile, a punishment of not inviting Bank j for N periods upon the failure of the loan Bank
j leads also works when N and ￿ satisfy certain conditions.
9in￿nite horizon that is conditional on the lead arranger exerting constant e⁄ort to monitor
the borrower, the moral hazard problem evaporates.16,17 I call this e⁄ect the "reciprocity"
e⁄ect in loan syndication as lead arrangers mutually bene￿t from each another￿ s monitoring
e⁄ort and reach a cooperative equilibrium that improves Pareto e¢ ciency.
2.4 Empirical Predictions
I have shown that if Bank i is not invited to participate in the loan Bank j leads, then Bank
i￿ s share ￿ in its own loan does not provide su¢ cient incentive for Bank i to monitor its
borrower. In this case, however, participant lenders in the syndicate who are able to lead
loans themselves will not allow Bank i to lead as a return of rm is demanded for relationship
loans and syndicated loans are considered relationship loans to lead arrangers. Thus, Bank
i must change its lead share ￿ and/or the interest rate charged on the loan r to satisfy the
following IC condition for it to monitor the borrower:18
￿0 ￿
1 + r0￿
￿ m ￿ p￿0 ￿
1 + r0￿
, (2)
where ￿0 and r0 are the lead share and the interest rate that satisfy (2).
From (2), I get
￿0 ￿
m




(1 ￿ p)￿0 ￿ 1. (4)
Suppose that r0 = r, then the minimum lead share that satis￿es (2) is ￿0
min = m
(1￿p)(1+r),
which is higher than the initial ￿ since ￿ < m
(1￿p)(1+r) with Assumption 2.
Now, suppose that ￿0 = ￿, then the minimum interest rate charged on the loan that
satis￿es (2) is r0
min = m
(1￿p)￿ ￿ 1, which is higher than the initial r since Assumption 2 also
implies that r < m
(1￿p)￿ ￿ 1.
Meanwhile, if no participant lenders in the syndicate are able to lead loans, then they
don￿ t have the bargaining power to make the lead arranger increase its lead share and/or
the interest rate. If both stay at their initial levels (￿ and r), the market expects the loan
to default with probability 1 ￿ p since the lead arranger will shirk on monitoring while the
making of the loan is still feasible with pZ ￿ Rf (Assumption 1). That is, a loan that does
16To justify the in￿nite horizon, I examine the survivability/￿nancial health of lending institutions in
the sample that ends in April 2007. I ￿nd that only three out of 830 lead arrangers (< 0.4%) ever ￿led
bankruptcies or were in ￿nancial distress, and these three lenders did not lead another syndicated loan
after they claimed ￿nancial trouble. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that lead arrangers face an in￿nitely
repeated game and are always concerned about their future pro￿ts, at least during my sample period. This,
however, may no longer be the case following the global ￿nancial crisis that began in July 2007.
17Meanwhile, cooperation may also sustain in a ￿nite horizon (e.g., the stage game repeated twice) if the
decision on o⁄ering the participation share ￿ is added to the strategy space.
18This IC condition is the same for both the one-shot game or the in￿nitely repeated game.
10not share reciprocity with another loan has a higher default probability than an otherwise
identical loan that shares reciprocity with another loan (1 ￿ p vs. 0 based on the model).
In summary, the model predicts that the moral hazard problem is reduced among loans
whose lead arrangers share reciprocity with one or more participant lenders, and this reduced
moral hazard is re￿ ected in the following empirical predictions:
￿ Prediction 1. Lead arrangers retain a smaller share (on average) of the loans they
lead if they are invited to participate in loans led by their participant lenders.
￿ Prediction 2. Interest rates are lower (on average) for loans whose lead arrangers have
reciprocal arrangements with their participant lenders.
￿ Prediction 3. The default rate is lower among loans that present reciprocity between
their lead arrangers and participant lenders.
Note that lead share, loan pricing (interest rate charged on the loan), and loan default
rate are commonly used in the literature to empirically measure the severity of the moral
hazard problem in syndicated loans. The reciprocity e⁄ect on moral hazard, i.e., how
reciprocal arrangements reduce moral hazard, will be tested in the empirical analysis.
3 Data and Empirical Implementation
In this section, I outline steps I take to implement the empirical analysis in the paper.
First, I describe brie￿ y the data and summary statistics. Then I discuss in some detail how
reciprocity is empirically de￿ned and measured.
3.1 Data
Three data sources are employed for the empirical tests: DealScan, Compustat, and the
bankruptcies data for public ￿rms.
Provided by Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), DealScan is a database that con-
tains extensive information on new loan originations in the global commercial loan market
since 1988.19 It is hence the primary data source on syndicated loans.20 I obtain from
DealScan detailed data on each individual loan, including: (i) loan terms and conditions
such as loan amount, maturity, pricing, and covenants, (ii) information on the borrower
such as its sales at closing, whether it is a private or public ￿rm, and whether it has an
19Selected coverage may go back as early as 1981. According to Carey and Hrycray (1999) and Carey and
Nini (2007), DealScan is a fairly complete and reliable data source for syndicated loans in the U.S. market.
20In DealScan, a loan facility is identi￿ed as a syndicated loan if its distribution method is "syndication."
I further exclude from the sample loans that are distributed through "syndication" but for which only one
lender is identi￿ed because the lead-participant relationship cannot be studied for these loans.
11S&P or Moody￿ s bond rating readily available, and (iii) information on the lenders and
their roles in the syndicate as well as shares of the loan.
The sample I employ consist of 46,448 closed or completed syndicated loan facilities
originated for 12,857 non-￿nancial U.S. ￿rms in 74 2-digit SIC industries between 1992 and
April 2007. These loans involved 830 lead arrangers from 31 countries, of which 623 (75%)
are headquartered in the U.S. Based on Standard & Poor￿ s A Guide to the Loan Market
(October 2007), I classify lenders as lead arrangers if their lender titles are among the
following: administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, coordinating arranger, lead
arranger, lead bank, lead manager, and mandated arranger.21 I exclude loans with more
than one lead arranger identi￿ed because it is hard to identify for these loans with which
lead arranger a participant lender intends to build or share reciprocity. This exclusion does
not a⁄ect the sample size to any signi￿cant degree as 96% of syndicated loan facilities in
the U.S. market have only one lead arranger.
I evaluate syndicated loans at the facility level. A loan facility is also called a loan
tranche, and one syndicated loan deal (also called package) may contain multiple tranches.
In my sample, there are 30,546 syndicated loan deals, of which 65% contain only one tranche,
22% contain two tranches, 9% contain three tranches, and the remaining contain four to
as many as eleven tranches. The average number is 1.5 tranches per syndicated loan deal.
The reason for a facility-level analysis as opposed to a deal-level analysis is that di⁄erent
tranches within the same loan deal may have di⁄erent loan types (e.g., term loan, letter
of credit, etc.), maturities, interest spreads, and syndicate structures (e.g., share retained
by the lead arranger). Sometimes a loan deal has one tranche made through syndication
and another through a sole lender. All these are key pieces of information for the empirical
analysis, so ignoring them and treating facilities as homogenous within each loan deal would
cause a loss of valuable information.
In order to obtain richer ￿nancial information on individual ￿rms, I manually match
DealScan with Compustat based on ￿rm name, ticker, and location for borrowers that are
public ￿rms, have a ticker, and/or a credit rating. I am able to retrieve ￿nancial data from
Compustat for 20,140 loan facilities (43% of the sample).
Lastly, I search bankruptcies data compiled by New Generation Research through SDC.
This database contains all U.S. public companies that have $10 million or more in assets
and have ￿led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since 1988. Companies with assets
over $50 million that have had a default or an exchange o⁄er at a substantial discount to
face value are also included. Hence, the rule is that a loan is considered in default if the
borrowing ￿rm appears in this bankruptcies database at a time while the loan is active (i.e.,
after the beginning date of the loan but before the maturity date). The bankruptcies data
21If no lead arranger or multiple lead arrangers are identi￿ed using the list, I then cross-check the infor-
mation with a variable named LeadArrangerCredit in DealScan.
12are matched with DealScan ￿rst through Compustat based on ￿rms￿6-digit CUSIP, i.e.,
the issuer code, and then directly based on ￿rm name, location, and industry if no match is
found in the ￿rst step. I am able to identify 1,317 incidents of default (6.4%) among 20,696
loans made to public ￿rms or ￿rms that can be matched in Compustat.
In contrast to what is typically done in the empirical literature on syndicated loans, I do
not aggregate ￿nancial institutions to their parent companies. The reason for this lies in the
speci￿cness of both the lender-borrower and lead-participant relationships. Holding com-
panies are usually not the ones engaged in developing relationships with speci￿c borrowers
(i.e., monitoring) or other lenders (i.e., sharing reciprocity), especially those that gained
control through mergers and acquisitions. Although results are mainly reported based on
individual ￿rms rather than their parent companies, I will show later that this is not an
issue in either the measures or the e⁄ect of reciprocity.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the sample of syndicated loans. All statistics are
provided at the loan facility level, including those describing borrower and lead arranger
characteristics.
An average borrowing ￿rm has sales of $2.54 billion at loan closing. A slim majority
(60%) have previously borrowed from the syndicated loan market at least once, and the
average number of previous syndicated loans among all the borrowers is 1.9 loan facilities.
Among borrowers whose ￿rms type is known, 45% are identi￿ed as private ￿rms, whereas
24% are public ￿rms without bond ratings and 31% are public ￿rms with bond ratings.22,23
Among borrowers who are or have been public ￿rms, 4% had loans that were previously in
default. Among borrowers who have Compustat data available, the average book value of
total assets is $5.1 billion, the average book leverage ratio is 36%, the average earnings to
assets ratio is 7%, and 47% have S&P debt ratings.
Lead arrangers of these loans have an average market share of 5% in the previous year,
measured by the amount of loans led by each lead arranger as a percentage of the total
amount originated in the U.S. syndicated loan market. About six out of seven loans (87%)
have lead arrangers that are banks (as opposed to ￿nance companies, institutional investors,
etc.) and hence are considered having expertise in relationship lending.
An average syndicated loan facility has a size (loan amount) of $217 million and maturity
of 50 months. The average interest spread on drawn funds is 221 basis points over LIBOR;
22For a little over 11,000 loan facilities (24% of the sample), the type of the borrowing ￿rm is unknown.
23The ￿rm type indicated in DealScan is the most current status for the borrower and hence does not
re￿ ect the change between public and private, nor between rated and unrated. I cross-check the ￿rm type
with Compustat data, i.e., whether a borrower can be found in Compustat at the time the loan was originated
and whether a credit rating was available then. Note that no borrowers that are indicated as private ￿rms
in DealScan are identi￿ed as becoming or once being publicly traded during the sample period.
13netting the upfront fee, this average drops to 173 basis points. About one-third (32%) of
facilities are classi￿ed as term loans. On average, there are 7.2 lenders in one syndicate,
and the lead arranger retains 29.5% of the loan.24 The most common reason for borrowing
is working capital or corporate purposes (60%), followed by re￿nancing (26%), acquisitions
(26%), and backup lines (7%).
Default can be identi￿ed among 20,696 loan facilities whose borrowers are/were public
￿rms. The average default rate for the entire sample period (1992-2007) is 6.4%. There is,
however, a right-censoring issue with the default data since loans originated in more recent
years have a smaller probability of default given a shorter period of time. This issue is
con￿rmed when I move the ending point of the sample earlier. For example, the default
rate is elevated to 9.1% if I shorten the sample period to 1992-2001. I will deal with the
right-censored default data when I test the e⁄ect of reciprocity on loan default.
3.3 Measures of Reciprocity
Reciprocal arrangements among lead arrangers in the syndicated loan market are of central
interest in this paper. In order to study their impact on the moral hazard problem, I de￿ne
reciprocity as follows:
De￿nition 1 A syndicated loan, Loan A, is considered having reciprocity with another
syndicated loan, Loan B, if (1) Loan A￿ s lead arranger is one of the participant lenders of
Loan B, and (2) one of Loan A￿ s participant lenders is Loan B￿ s lead arranger. Loan A (B)
is called the reciprocal loan of Loan B (A), and Loan B￿ s (A￿ s) lead arranger is Loan A￿ s
(B￿ s) reciprocal participant lender.
Reciprocity can exist in any of the following three forms based on how the periods of
the two loans that share reciprocity overlap:
De￿nition 2 Suppose that Loan A and Loan B have reciprocity with each other according
to De￿nition 1. If the loan periods of Loan A and Loan B overlap, then both Loan A and
Loan B are considered having current reciprocity with each other. If Loan A matures
before Loan B begins, then Loan A is considered having future reciprocity with Loan B,
whereas Loan B is considered having past reciprocity with Loan A.
I then de￿ne the following four measures to examine the existence and magnitude of
reciprocity for each syndicated loan facility in the sample:
1. Reciprocity existence is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan shares reciprocity
with another loan and 0 otherwise.
24The share retained by the lead arranger is available for only 11,083 loan facilities (24% of the sample).
Thus, there may be some sample selection bias in spite of the fact that this is a widely used variable in the
empirical literature on syndicated loans.
142. Reciprocity breadth is the fraction of reciprocal participant lenders among all par-
ticipant lenders in the syndicate. In general, the lead arranger￿ s pro￿ts from loan
participation increase in the number of reciprocal participants as each of them shares
some pro￿ts with the lead. Thus, the hypothesis is that the broader the reciprocity,
the stronger the e⁄ect in reducing moral hazard.
3. Reciprocity depth is the average fraction of reciprocal loans taken by the lead arranger.
This is essentially the average participation share, say ￿. Thus, the hypothesis is that
the deeper the reciprocity, the stronger the reciprocity e⁄ect.
4. Reciprocity length is the average fraction of the loan period (maturity) overlapped
with reciprocal loans. The total pro￿ts from participation for the lead arranger equal
to the pro￿ts provided by its reciprocal participant lenders summed over time units
(e.g., months) overlapped with the period of the loan it leads. Thus, the hypothesis
is that the longer the reciprocity, the stronger the reciprocity e⁄ect.
I further di⁄erentiate the following two types of reciprocity based on at what time
reciprocity is measured:
1. Total reciprocity is the reciprocity that is observed over the entire sample period. It
includes the reciprocity that is formed both before and after the loan is in place, and
hence, it is the reciprocity that exists both ex ante and ex post.
2. Reciprocity at origination is the reciprocity that is in existence before the loan starts,
i.e., at the time of origination. Thus, it is the reciprocity formed ex ante when the
lead arranger can decide with whom it shares the reciprocity.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on various types, forms, and measures of reciprocity
discussed above. Panel A shows reciprocity at origination: 71% of loans have current reci-
procity, 63% have past reciprocity, 1.5% have future reciprocity, and 80% of loans possess
reciprocity of at least one form.25 Furthermore, when only current reciprocity is considered,
the average reciprocity breadth is 45% of participant lenders being reciprocal, the average
reciprocity depth is 8.5% of reciprocal loans taken by the lead arranger, and the average
reciprocity length is 46% of the loan period overlapped with reciprocal loans.
Panel B of Table 4 compares reciprocity at origination with total reciprocity. Only
means on the form of current reciprocity are reported in this panel. The fact that measures
of reciprocity at origination are only slightly lower than total reciprocity in spite of being a
subset of the latter indicates that reciprocity is formed mostly ex ante.
25The existence of future reciprocity at origination is extremely low because the de￿nition of reciprocity
at origination restricts considerations of reciprocal arrangements among those formed prior to origination.
15Reciprocity at origination is more appropriate than total reciprocity for the purpose of
examining how reciprocity a⁄ects the structure of the syndicate as well as the design of
the loan contract because the lead arranger decides whether and with whom it will build
reciprocity before the loan starts. Therefore, for the rest of the paper, I focus on current
reciprocity at origination while the main results also hold for other types and forms of
reciprocity. I also abbreviate the term current reciprocity at origination as "reciprocity."
Lastly, Panel B of Table 4 also shows the measures of current reciprocity at origination
among lead arrangers that have di⁄erent parent companies. This way reciprocity shared
within the same holding company is excluded. However, the summary statistics rarely
change with this exclusion, which then indicates that it is not an issue not aggregating
￿nancial institutions to their parent companies since reciprocity is usually not shared among
subsidiaries of the same holding company.
4 Empirical Evidence on the Reciprocity E⁄ect
In this section, I present empirical results on the role of reciprocity in mitigating moral
hazard in loan syndication. First, results from bivariate tests including t-tests and simple
correlations are discussed brie￿ y. Then, I provide the general regression speci￿cation for
testing the reciprocity e⁄ect, followed by discussions of how reciprocity impacts syndicate
structure, loan pricing, and loan default. Lastly, I discuss the robustness of the results by
examining the interactions between reciprocity and information asymmetry, borrower size,
loan size, and lead arranger and borrower reputation.
4.1 Bivariate Tests
Table 5 reports results from bivariate tests including t-tests and correlations.
Panel A compares a number of loan characteristics between two groups of syndicated
loans ￿(1) loans with reciprocity and (2) loans without reciprocity ￿through t-tests. Con-
sistent with Predictions 1-3, lead arrangers retain on average 21% less of the loans with
reciprocity than those without reciprocity (25% vs. 46%), the average interest spread on
drawn funds over LIBOR is 72 basis points lower for loans with reciprocity (202 vs. 274),
and the default rate is also 5.9% lower among loans with reciprocity for the entire sample
period (5.2% vs. 11.0%). All these mean di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant at the 1%
level. Furthermore, the di⁄erences between the two groups in loan pricing and loan default
remain substantial and statistically signi￿cant when I use the interest spread net upfront
fee as an alternative measure of loan pricing (159 vs. 219) and examine the loan default
rate during a shortened sample period, i.e., 1992-2001 (7.5% vs. 14.1%).
Panel B shows correlations between reciprocity and loan characteristics. Lead share,
interest spreads, and loan default rates are all signi￿cantly and negatively correlated with
16reciprocity at the 1% level. This result is consistent across all four reciprocity measures.
In untabulated results, I ￿nd that among loans with reciprocity, it is more like to have
secured loans and impose various types of covenants, including dividend restriction, ￿nancial
ratios, asset sale sweep, debt issuance sweep, and equity issuance sweep. As a result, the
covenant intensity index based on Bradley and Roberts (2004) is higher among loans with
reciprocity than those without reciprocity. Reciprocity existence, reciprocity depth, and
reciprocity length are also positively correlated with the usage of collateral and covenants.
These bivariate test results seem to indicate that collateral and covenants as monitoring
mechanisms are set up more frequently in the presence of reciprocity (i.e., when the moral
hazard problem is mitigated).26
4.2 Regression Speci￿cation
Now, I examine the e⁄ect of reciprocity on moral hazard with more control variables. The
general regression speci￿cation is
Syndicatei;j;k;t = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ Reciprocityi + ￿2 ￿ InformationAsymmetryj (5)
+￿3 ￿ LeadReputationk + ￿4 ￿ OtherLeadCharacteristicsk
+￿5 ￿ BorrowerReputationj + ￿6 ￿ OtherBorrowerCharacteristicsj
+￿7 ￿ LoanCharacteristicsi + Yeart + "i;j;k;t.
The left-hand-side (dependent) variables are characteristics variables of the syndicated loan
i made to borrowing ￿rm j by lead arranger k in year t, including the share retained by
the lead arranger, the interest spread on drawn funds over LIBOR, and the loan default
indicator. The key right-hand-side (independent) variable is Reciprocity and the parameter
of interest is ￿1, which measures how change in reciprocity a⁄ects syndicate structure, loan
pricing, and the probability of default. Recall that reciprocity is measured by four variables,
i.e., reciprocity existence, reciprocity breadth, reciprocity depth, and reciprocity length.
A number of control variables are included in the regressions. First, due to their sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ects on syndicated loans that have been documented in the literature, I control
for the degree of information asymmetry of the borrower and the reputation of both the
lead arranger and the borrower. As in Su￿ (2007), information asymmetry is measured by
indicator variables for private versus public ownership of the borrower, and for whether the
borrowing ￿rm has a bond rating or not. Lead arranger reputation is measured by two
variables: (1) the lead arranger￿ s market share in the previous year, which is same as in
Su￿ (2007), and (2) the repeat participant ratio in the previous year, which is similar to
26The analysis on covenants is beyond the scope of this paper. The data available on covenants are very
limited ￿for a large number of loans in DealScan, information on covenants is completely missing ￿and
hence can possibly produce biased results.
17what Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Ivashina (2009) use. The latter is the maximum
number of loan facilities participated in by the same lender, scaled by the total number of
loan facilities arranged by the lead. I use both variables as proxies for the lead arranger
reputation because with a signi￿cant, negative correlation (-0.11), they can cover di⁄erent
perspectives of the lead arranger reputation. Borrower reputation is measured by the nat-
ural logarithm of one plus the number of previous syndicated loans by the borrower. The
same approach can also be found in Su￿ (2007).
Then, I introduce controls for (1) other lead arranger characteristics (whether the lead is
a bank), (2) other borrower characteristics (the natural logarithm of sales at closing, whether
any previous loans were in default), and (3) loan characteristics (the natural logarithm of
loan amount and maturity in days, the term loan indicator, and indicator variables for
the interest rate type and the purpose of the loan). Year ￿xed e⁄ects are included in all
the regressions, whereas 2-digit SIC industry, borrower, and lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects are
added properly under di⁄erent regression speci￿cations. These ￿xed e⁄ects are employed
to deal with the issue of omitted variables. Lastly, I use robust standard errors clustered
within borrowers, lead arrangers, or borrower-lead groups to deal with heteroskedasticity.
All these are standard approaches seen in the literature [e.g., Peterson (2009)].
4.3 Reciprocity and Syndicate Structure
Table 6 reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions of ￿ve speci￿cations relating the share
of the loan retained by the lead arranger to reciprocity existence. The regression coe¢ cient
on reciprocity ￿1 is signi￿cantly negative across all these speci￿cations at the 1% level.
Speci￿cations (I)-(V) mainly di⁄er in the types of ￿xed e⁄ects included in the regressions as
well as the variable within which robust standard errors are clustered. One other di⁄erence
between Speci￿cation (I) and the rest is that Speci￿cation (I) does not include two important
control variables: (1) the natural logarithm of one plus the number of participant lenders in
the syndicate, and (2) the sum of all the participants￿market shares in the previous year.27
I include these two variables as additional controls in Speci￿cations (II)-(V) to remove
the mechanic e⁄ect that more and larger participants may have on the likelihood of the
loan having reciprocity. Speci￿cation (I) shows that, without them, ￿1 = ￿10%, whereas
this coe¢ cient estimate decreases by half to about 4-5% under Speci￿cations (II)-(V). This
veri￿es the importance of these two additional control variables. I consider Speci￿cation
(V) the most conservative (and hence the best) test for examining the e⁄ect of reciprocity
on syndicate structure as it controls for both borrower and lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects with
robust standard errors allowing for clustering within each unique borrower-lead group. It
27Note that participants￿market shares are computed based on the total amount of the loans they lead
globally since reciprocity is measured among all the loans in DealScan which include loans in countries other
than the U.S., whereas the lead arranger￿ s reputation is partly measured by its market share in the U.S. as
the focus of this paper is on the U.S. syndicated loan market.
18shows that lead arrangers retain on average 4.3% less of the loans with reciprocity than
those without reciprocity. This result is both statistically and economically signi￿cant. I
have shown that the average share of the loan retained by lead arrangers is 29.5%, so a
share that is 4.3% less is a reduction of 15%. With an average loan amount of $217 million,
this implies that reciprocity can save lead arrangers about $9 million per syndicated loan
for other uses, which then may make better diversi￿cation feasible for lenders.
Table 7 reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressing the lead share on each of the four
reciprocity measures. All regressions reported in Table 7 follow Speci￿cation (V) in Table
6. The coe¢ cient on reciprocity ￿1 is signi￿cantly negative across all four measures of
reciprocity at the 1% level. Column (II) indicates that while reciprocity breadth increases
from zero to 100% reciprocal participants in the syndicate, the lead arranger can retain
nearly 7% less of the loan. Similarly, Column (III) says that if hypothetically reciprocity
depth moves from a 0% share the lead arranger holds in loans led by the participants to 100%,
the share the lead retains in its own loan decreases by 13%. Column (IV) further shows
that as reciprocity length improves from 0% to 100% of the loan period that is overlapped
with reciprocal loans, the lead share drops by nearly 5%. All these results consistently point
to an increasing reciprocity e⁄ect on syndicate structure with a higher degree of reciprocity.
Without controlling for the number and size of the participant lenders in the syndicate, I
￿nd the expected e⁄ects of information asymmetry, lead arranger reputation, and borrower
reputation [Speci￿cation (I) in Table 6]. First, the average lead share of loans to public,
unrated ￿rms is signi￿cantly higher than that to public, rated ￿rms by 2%, whereas the
average lead share of loans to private ￿rms is not signi￿cantly higher. Second, lead arranger
reputation proxied by the market share in the previous year plays a signi￿cant role in
lowering the share retained by the lead arranger as in the literature. Third, borrower
reputation also has a signi￿cant, negative relation with the lead share, which implies that
if the borrower is a repeat customer in the syndicated loan market, the lead arranger is
required to take less share of the loan as the moral hazard problem is less severe. Once
the additional control variables are included in the regression, the e⁄ects of information
asymmetry and borrower reputation are no longer signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cient on lead
arranger￿ s previous-year market share remains signi￿cantly negative under Speci￿cation (V)
in Table 6. The signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cients on the number of participant lenders in the
syndicate and the lead arranger being a bank indicator as well as the signi￿cantly positive
coe¢ cient on the term loan indicator have straightforward economic interpretations.
4.4 Reciprocity and Loan Pricing
Table 8 reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions of ￿ve speci￿cations relating the in-
terest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds to reciprocity existence. Speci￿cations (I)-(V)
replicate their counterparts in Table 6 in terms of independent variables, ￿xed e⁄ects, and
19types of robust standard errors. The coe¢ cient on reciprocity ￿1 is also negative and sig-
ni￿cant at the 1% level across all these speci￿cations. Speci￿cation (V) is again considered
the most conservative among all with both borrower and lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects as well
as robust standard errors clustered within borrower-lead groups. It shows that on average
the interest spread is 11 basis points lower on loans with reciprocity than those without
reciprocity. This is a 5% reduction from the average interest spread of 221 basis points.
Consider the average loan amount of $217 million and the average maturity of 50 months, 11
basis points mean $238,700 savings in interest payments per year and $994,583 savings for
the entire life of the loan.28 Thus, reciprocity among syndicate lenders implies signi￿cantly
lower borrowing costs to corporations, both statistically and economically.
Table 9 then reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressing the interest spread on each of
the four reciprocity measures. All regressions reported in Table 9 follow Speci￿cation (V)
in Table 8. Columns (II)-(IV) show that the coe¢ cients on reciprocity breadth, reciprocity
depth, and reciprocity length are -17, -23, and -16 basis points, respectively. While all being
very negative, they are signi￿cant at the 1% level except that the coe¢ cient on reciprocity
depth is marginally signi￿cant at the level of 15%. Thus, the evidence is quite strong to say
that the reciprocity e⁄ect on loan pricing is increasing in the magnitude of reciprocity.
Table 8 also shows the following results. Private ￿rms bear higher interest spreads,
which are on average 10-13 basis points higher than those for public, rated ￿rms. Results
on interest spreads charged for public, unrated ￿rms are mixed, i.e., sometimes higher and
sometimes lower than interest spreads charged for their rated counterparts. Lead arranger
reputation does not have a signi￿cant impact on the price of the loan. However, loans have
signi￿cantly lower interest spreads if their lead arrangers are banks and/or the total market
share of the participants is higher. Regarding borrower and loan characteristics, the interest
spread decreases with borrower sales and loan amount, and the average interest spread on
terms loans is estimated to be about 40-70 basis points higher.
4.5 Reciprocity and Loan Default
In order to correct for the right-censored loan default data, I shorten the sample period by
the median maturity, which is about 60 months (1,799 days). As a result, the sample for the
reported loan default tests consists of loan facilities that were originated during 1992-2001.
However, the main results on loan default are not sensitive to such sample selection.
Table 10 reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions of ￿ve speci￿cations (three OLS,
one Probit, and one Logit) relating loan default to reciprocity existence. The coe¢ cient
on reciprocity ￿1 is again signi￿cantly negative across all these speci￿cations at the 1%
level. Speci￿cations (I)-(III) use OLS to estimate the linear probability of loan default, and
meanwhile, they di⁄er in the selection of independent variables, ￿xed e⁄ects, and types of
28Annual interest payments and zero amortization are assumed here.
20robust standard errors. Borrower ￿xed e⁄ects are not included in this group of tests because
￿rst, loan default is de￿ned at the borrower level during the same period, and second, there
are few cases in which variations in reciprocity existence and loan default coexist for the
same borrower. Speci￿cations (IV) and (V) use Probit and Logit, respectively, with year and
borrower industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Lead arranger and borrower ￿xed e⁄ects are not included in
these two speci￿cations due to concerns of the "incidental parameters problem" [e.g., Green
(2004)]. I consider Speci￿cation (III) the most conservative test among all with borrower
industry and lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects as well as robust standard errors clustered within
borrowers. The coe¢ cient on reciprocity existence under Speci￿cation (III) is -0.047, which
translates into a 4.7% lower chance of loan default. Compared to an overall 9.1% default
rate of loans originated during 1992-2001, this reduces the default rate by half (52%) and
hence has strong economic signi￿cance.
Table 11 then reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressing loan default on each of the
four reciprocity measures. All regressions reported in Table 11 follow Speci￿cation (III) in
Table 10. Columns (II)-(IV) show that the coe¢ cients on reciprocity breadth, reciprocity
depth, and reciprocity length are -4.8%, -20.5%, and -4.5%, respectively, all of which indicate
a signi￿cantly negative relation between the probability of default and the magnitude of
reciprocity at the 1% level.
Default probability is about 2% higher for loans made to public, unrated ￿rms, 2-3%
higher for term loans, but 5-7% lower for borrowers who experienced default previously.
Meanwhile, it decreases in the market shares of the lead arranger and participants, but
increases in loan maturity, the number of previous loans by the borrower, and the number
of participants in the syndicate.
4.6 Robustness
Thus far I have shown evidence that is consistent with Predictions 1-3. One may argue
that the existence and/or magnitude of reciprocity is highly related to various characteris-
tics of borrowers, loans, and lead arrangers such as ￿rm size, loan size, lead arranger and
borrower reputation, etc. For example, larger borrowers tend to work with larger banks
who are more likely to form networks among themselves and hence share reciprocity. Sim-
ilarly, larger loans requires more funds; with capital constraints and binding regulatory
requirements, lenders may be forced to team up. Meanwhile, as the borrower becomes
more informationally transparent or the lead arranger/borrower becomes more reputable,
it is easier to syndicate the loan with more participant lenders, which then increases the
likelihood of having reciprocity. As a result, the reciprocity e⁄ect may be mostly an e⁄ect
of these variables. That is, reciprocity is endogenously determined by other independent
variables in the regression. Due to potentially omitted variables, the estimated coe¢ cient
￿1 may not be an unbiased estimator of the true reciprocity e⁄ect.
21To address this endogeneity problem, other than having control variables and various
￿xed e⁄ects in the regressions, I take a step further to examine the interactions between
reciprocity and (1) information asymmetry, (2) borrower size, (3) loan size, (4) lead arranger
reputation, and (5) borrower reputation. I ￿nd that the reciprocity e⁄ect remains signi￿-
cant for informationally opaque borrowers, smaller borrowers, smaller loans, less reputable
lead arrangers, and less reputable borrowers. Meanwhile, I show that the results are ro-
bust to alternative information asymmetry and reciprocity measures and persist in various
subsamples.
Each panel of Table 12 reports detailed results from regressions of three dependent
variables: the lead share, the interest spread, and the loan default indicator. Other than
some additional interaction terms with reciprocity, all the regressions of lead share follow
Speci￿cation (V) in Table 6, all the regressions of interest spread follow Speci￿cation (V) in
Table 8, and all the regressions of loan default follow Speci￿cation (III) in Table 10. The
independent variables of interest are reciprocity existence and the interaction terms with
reciprocity existence.
4.6.1 Information Asymmetry
In order to examine whether the reciprocity e⁄ect is di⁄erent between informationally trans-
parent and opaque borrowers, I add to the regression speci￿cations an interaction term of
reciprocity and information transparency, i.e., reciprocity existence ￿ transparent, where
transparent is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the borrower is a public, rated ￿rm
and 0 otherwise. Now, ￿1 indicates the reciprocity e⁄ect when the borrowers are infor-
mationally opaque (i.e., private or public, unrated ￿rms), and the coe¢ cient on reciprocity
existence ￿ transparent, say ￿0
1, indicates the incremental reciprocity e⁄ect when borrowers
are informationally transparent (i.e., public, rated ￿rms).
Panel A of Table 12 shows that the coe¢ cient on reciprocity ￿1 remains signi￿cantly
negative at the 1% level in the regressions of lead share, interest spread, and loan default.
However, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term ￿0
1 is not signi￿cant in any of the three
regressions. These coe¢ cients indicate that (1) the reciprocity e⁄ect exists regardless of
whether the borrower is informationally transparent or opaque, and (2) there is no additional
bene￿t from reciprocity for borrowers that are informationally transparent.
In a robustness check, I split the sample by whether the borrower had Compustat data
available one year before the loan was originated and use accounting information such as
earnings to assets ratio, book leverage ratio, and accruals to assets ratio as additional control
variables for borrowers with Compustat data. Panel B of Table 12 shows that the reciprocity
e⁄ect survives for borrowers both with and without Compustat data. The coe¢ cient on
reciprocity ￿1 is not signi￿cant only in the regression of loan default for borrowers without
Compustat data. This is, however, probably due to the fact that most borrowers that had
22no Compustat data available one year prior to borrowing are private ￿rms for which loan
default cannot be identi￿ed. Note that the sample size for this particular regression is only
290 observations.
4.6.2 Borrower Size
To examine whether the reciprocity e⁄ect is driven by the size of the borrower, I run the
regressions with the interaction terms of reciprocity and borrower size. I split the sample
into three groups based on the borrower￿ s sales at closing, de￿ne small, mid-sized, and large
borrowers as the smallest, middle, and largest one-third of the borrowers, and construct
two interaction terms, reciprocity existence ￿ mid-sized borrower and reciprocity existence
￿ large borrower, as additional regressors. Hence, the coe¢ cient on reciprocity ￿1 indicates
the reciprocity e⁄ect for the group of small borrowers, whereas the coe¢ cients on reciprocity
existence ￿ mid-sized borrower and reciprocity existence ￿ large borrower, say ￿0
1 and ￿00
1,
indicate the incremental reciprocity e⁄ect for mid-sized and large borrowers, respectively.
Panel C of Table 12 shows that the reciprocity e⁄ect on lead share and loan default
remains signi￿cant and strong even among loans to small borrowers. The e⁄ect on interest
spread is not signi￿cant among small borrowers, but the incremental reciprocity e⁄ect in
reducing interest spread is signi￿cant for mid-sized borrowers, which indicates that this
e⁄ect is not dominated by large borrowers. These results are not sensitive to how many
groups I split the sample into based on borrowers￿sales at closing.
4.6.3 Loan Size
I employ a similar approach to examine the interaction between reciprocity and loan size.
I ￿rst split the sample into three groups based on the loan amount, de￿ne small, mid-sized,
and large loans as the smallest, middle, and largest one-third of the loans in the sample, and
then construct two interaction terms, reciprocity existence ￿ mid-sized loan and reciprocity
existence ￿ large loan, as additional regressors. Hence, the coe¢ cient on reciprocity indi-
cates the reciprocity e⁄ect for small loans, whereas the coe¢ cients on reciprocity existence
￿ mid-sized loan and reciprocity existence ￿ large loan indicate the incremental reciprocity
e⁄ect for mid-sized and large loans, respectively.
Panel D of Table 12 shows that the reciprocity e⁄ect on loan default is signi￿cant even
for small loans. Although the e⁄ect on lead share and interest spread is not signi￿cant
among small loans, the incremental reciprocity e⁄ect in reducing lead share and interest
spread is signi￿cant for mid-sized loans, which indicates that the e⁄ect does not only exist
among large loans. These results are also not sensitive to how many groups I split the
sample into based on the size of the loan.
234.6.4 Lead Arranger Reputation
To examine whether the reciprocity e⁄ect is driven by the lead arranger reputation, I add to
the regressions an interaction term, reciprocity existence ￿ reputable lead, where reputable
lead is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the lead arranger￿ s previous-year share in the
U.S. syndicated loan market is greater than the median market share, i.e., 1%. Then, the
coe¢ cient on reciprocity indicates the reciprocity e⁄ect when the lead arranger is less rep-
utable, and the coe¢ cient on reciprocity existence ￿ reputable lead indicates the incremental
reciprocity e⁄ect when the lead arranger has better reputation.
Panel E of Table 12 shows that the reciprocity e⁄ect on lead share, interest spread, and
loan default is all signi￿cant and strong regardless of the lead arranger reputation. This
means that reciprocity helps less reputable lead arrangers convince their participant lenders
that there is little moral hazard in loans they lead and hence make it feasible for them to
retain smaller shares of the loans and charge lower interest spreads to the borrowers.
4.6.5 Borrower Reputation
I examine whether the reciprocity e⁄ect is driven by the borrower reputation in a similar
way. That is, I add to the regressions an interaction term, reciprocity existence ￿ reputable
borrower, where reputable borrower is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the borrower has
previously borrowed from the syndicated loan market. Then, the coe¢ cient on reciprocity
indicates the reciprocity e⁄ect when the borrower is a new customer and hence has no rep-
utation in this market, whereas the coe¢ cient on reciprocity existence ￿ reputable borrower
indicates the incremental reciprocity e⁄ect when the borrower is a repeat customer of this
market.
Panel F of Table 12 shows that the reciprocity e⁄ect on lead share, interest spread,
and loan default is all signi￿cant and strong regardless of whether the borrower is a new or
repeat customer of the syndicated loan market. Meanwhile, there is a signi￿cant incremental
reciprocity e⁄ect on lead share for reputable borrowers.
4.6.6 Other Robustness Tests
In order to reduce the possibility that the reciprocity e⁄ect is driven by the largest lead
arrangers, I exclude loans that were arranged by the top three lead arrangers (of the year
in which each loan was originated) from the sample. Panel G of Table 12 shows that the
reciprocity e⁄ect on lead share, interest spread, and loan default is still signi￿cant and
strong among the remaining loans that were arranged by smaller lead arrangers.
Banks are typically considered having expertise in monitoring borrowers. If this is true,
then the reciprocity e⁄ect must remain signi￿cant among loans arranged by banks. Panel H
of Table 12 shows that this is indeed the case as the regressions of lead share, interest spread,
24and loan default all estimate an expected signi￿cant, negative coe¢ cient on reciprocity ￿1
using a subsample of loans whose lead arrangers were banks.
Lastly, I run the set of regressions on reciprocity that is measured only among lead
arrangers that have di⁄erent parent companies. Panel I of Table 12 shows that results
are very close to those obtained earlier without this restriction. Hence, whether ￿nancial
institutions are aggregated to their parent companies does not a⁄ect the evidence on the
reciprocity e⁄ect.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the widespread phenomenon of reciprocity in loan syndication and ex-
amines its signi￿cant e⁄ect (net the direct e⁄ect of information asymmetry and reputation)
in mitigating agency con￿ icts between lead arrangers and participant lenders.
Reciprocal arrangements in the syndicated loan market make it incentive compatible for
lead arrangers to monitor borrowers as it is the implicit condition that enables lenders to
participate in others￿loans and obtain a share of pro￿ts from these loans as free-riders. This
then leads to a cooperative equilibrium outcome: the rents for relationship lending become
sustainable as lead arrangers persistently monitor their borrowers and share the resulting
surplus with participant lenders. This is the reciprocity e⁄ect.
The theoretical model predicts that this reciprocity e⁄ect and the resulting reduced
moral hazard are re￿ ected in a smaller share of the loan retained by the lead arranger, a lower
interest rate charged to the borrower, and a lower default probability of the loan. When I
confront these predictions with the data, I uncover strong and consistent empirical evidence.
The fact that the reciprocity e⁄ect exists even for informationally opaque borrowers and
less reputable lead arrangers indicates that this e⁄ect is indeed distinct from the incentive
and reputation e⁄ects that have been documented in the literature.
These results thus show important implications to both lending institutions and borrow-
ing ￿rms. For lenders, the reciprocity e⁄ect translates into smaller shares retained of loans
they lead, and hence less capital tied to individual loans and possibly better risk diversi-
￿cation from being able to participate in more loans. For corporations, reciprocity shared
among lead arrangers means lower borrowing costs, which may have made the syndicated
loan market more attractive than other channels of borrowing in recent years.
The reciprocity e⁄ect is also of regulatory signi￿cance. The fact that the banking in-
dustry is competitive and fragile at the same time makes regulation a crucial device to
maintain stability [e.g., Vives (2008)]. The cooperative equilibrium due to reciprocity and
the resulting lower default rate in the syndicated loan market may improve social welfare.
Thus, this paper provides potential policy suggestions for regulators.
For future research, it may be interesting to examine whether there are any changes in
25the structure of reciprocal arrangements and the resulting reciprocity e⁄ect in the syndi-
cated loan market following the 2007-2009 global ￿nancial crisis. As the ￿nancial system
has become more vulnerable and many ￿nancial institutions have failed or are facing signif-
icantly higher risk of failure, lead arrangers may be shortsighted and not care about their
future pro￿ts as much as in the "normal" time, especially those on the verge of collapsing.
As a result, the in￿nite horizon may not exist during the crisis period, which will then
cause the long-run cooperation among lenders to break down. Exploring syndicated loan
data after July 2007 will provide us some understanding in this regard.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. There are two types of subgames for Bank i. In one type the previous-period
outcome of the project for which the loan it leads is borrowed is "success," whereas in the
other type the project outcome is "failure." Using the one-shot deviation principle, I show
that Bank i deviates from the equilibrium in neither type of subgames.
First, suppose that no participation share is given, then with only ￿ share of the loan
it leads, Bank i does not monitor (due to Assumption 2) and gets R0 ￿ p￿(1 + r) each
period. Thus, its expected payo⁄ over the in￿nite horizon is R0
1￿￿.
Next, I examine each of the two types of subgames.
Subgame (I): The project outcome of the previous period is "success."






If Bank i deviates for one period and then returns to the equilibrium strategy, its payo⁄
becomes
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In order for no bank to deviate at any time, RE
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￿
b + R0. (8)
Substituting in (8) with R￿ = (￿ + ￿)(1 + r) ￿ m, b = m ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿(1 + r), and
R0 = p￿(1 + r), I obtain the following condition on ￿ that satis￿es RE
I ￿ RD
I :










26(9) says that if ￿ ￿ ￿, both lead arrangers monitor in all periods.
Subgame (II): The project outcome of the previous period is "failure."
In this case, Bank i no longer receives the participation share ￿ from the loan Bank j
leads. Due to Assumption 2, there is not a su¢ ciently high incentive for Bank i to monitor.
I show below that Bank i does not deviate from the "do not monitor" strategy.
I write Bank i￿ s payo⁄ on the equilibrium path as
RE
II = p￿(1 + r) + ￿p￿(1 + r) + ￿2p￿(1 + r) + :::, (10)
and its one-shot deviation payo⁄ as
RD
II = ￿(1 + r) ￿ m + ￿p￿(1 + r) + ￿2p￿(1 + r) + :::. (11)
Then, RE
II ￿ RD
II if p￿(1 + r) ￿ ￿(1 + r) ￿ m, which holds trivially with Assumption 2.
Hence, when no participation share is given, Bank i never monitors its borrower as the lead
arranger of the loan.
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31Table 1: Top Ten Lead Arrangers and Participant Lenders
The U.S. Market, 2004-2006
This table lists the top ten lead arranges (by total loan facility amount originated) and the top
ten participant lenders (by total number of loan facilities participated) in the U.S. syndicated loan
market during 2004-2006. Lead arrangers￿total loan facility amounts originated are reported in
billion of U.S. dollars. Lead arrangers￿market shares are calculated based on the total loan amount
originated during this period, whereas each participant lender￿ s percent of facilities participated is
based on the total number of syndicated loan facilities originated. Loan amounts as well as market
share ￿gures are split equally over all lead arrangers for loans with multiple leads. All ￿nancial
institutions are aggregated to their parent companies. These results are compiled using LPC￿ s
DealScan data and hence are close to (but may not be identical to) LPC￿ s League Tables.
A. Top Ten Lead Arrangers








1 JPMorganChase 1,536.1 33.1% 3,095
2 Bank of America 843.4 18.2% 3,331
3 Citigroup 610.9 13.2% 967
4 Wachovia 282.5 6.1% 1,359
5 Deutsche Bank 140.6 3.0% 412
6 Credit Suisse 127.3 2.7% 656
7 Wells Fargo 85.2 1.8% 932
8 GE Capital 64.7 1.4% 1,113
9 UBS 60.5 1.3% 242
10 ABN AMRO 58.4 1.3% 701
B. Top Ten Participant Lenders






1 Bank of America 3,502 18.5%
2 Wachovia 3,198 16.9%
3 JPMorganChase 2,920 15.4%
4 ABN AMRO 2,913 15.3%
5 Wells Fargo 2,728 14.4%
6 U.S. Bancorp 2,455 12.9%
7 GE Capital 2,340 12.3%
8 Citigroup 2,197 11.6%
9 National City Corp. 2,099 11.1%
10 Royal Bank of Scotland 1,878 9.9%
32Table 2: Reciprocal Arrangements in Loan Syndication
The U.S. Market, 2004-2006
This table lists the top ten pairs of lead arrangers who participated in syndicated loan facilities
led by each other in the U.S. market during 2004-2006. To clearly identify the relationship between
a lead arranger and a participant lender, loan facilities with multiple lead arrangers are excluded.
The rank is based on the total number of loan facilities that involved both institutions in each pair
as either the lead arranger or a participant lender. The percent of facilities led by lead arranger is
based on the total number of loan facilities led by each lead arranger as the sole lead of the syndicate.
All ￿nancial institutions are aggregated to their parent companies.
Rank Lead Arranger ￿Participant Lender
Number of
Facilities
% of Facilities Led
by Lead Arranger
1
JPMorganChase ￿Bank of America













Bank of America ￿Wachovia













Bank of America ￿Citigroup






Bank of America ￿Wells Fargo




















Bank of America ￿ABN AMRO






JP Morgan ￿US Bancorp





33Table 3: Summary Statistics for Syndicated Loan Facilities
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 46,448 syndicated loan facilities made to
12,857 non-￿nancial U.S. ￿rms by 830 lead arrangers between 1992 and April 2007. All statistics are
calculated at the loan facility level, including those for borrower and lead arranger characteristics.
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Borrower characteristics:
Sales at closing ($mm) 35,345 2,540 10,600 60 445 5,330
# of previous syndicated loans 46,448 1.92 2.72 0 1 5
Private ￿rm indicator 35,309 0.45 0.50 0 0 1
Public, unrated ￿rm indicator 35,309 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Public, rated ￿rm indicator 35,309 0.31 0.46 0 0 1
Previous default indicator 20,696 0.04 0.19 0 0 0
Borrowers with Compustat data:
Total book assets ($mm) 18,046 5,073 21,927 121 914 11,376
Book leverage ratio 18,006 0.36 0.26 0.06 0.33 0.64
Earnings to assets ratio 17,903 0.07 0.57 -0.00 0.08 0.16
S&P debt rating indicator 20,140 0.47 0.50 0 0 1
Lead arranger characteristics:
Market share, previous year 46,448 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.17
Bank indicator 46,324 0.87 0.34 0 1 1
Syndicated loan characteristics:
Facility amount ($mm) 46,447 217 491 15 82 500
Maturity (days) 41,702 1,500 759 359 1,799 2,520
Spread on drawn funds (bps) 40,577 221 143 50 225 375
Upfront fee (bps) 6,154 56 58 10 38 125
Spread minus upfront fee (bps) 5,975 173 119 43 163 311
Term loan indicator 46,448 0.32 0.47 0 0 1
Default indicator (full sample) 20,696 0.064 0.244 0 0 0
Default indicator (1992-2001) 12,563 0.091 0.288 0 0 0
Syndicate structure:
# of lenders in the syndicate 46,448 7.19 7.80 2 4 16
% retained by lead arranger 11,083 29.50 20.31 8.18 24.17 59.77
Purpose of loan indicator:
Working capital/corporate 46,448 0.60 0.49 0 1 1
Re￿nancing 46,448 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Acquisitions 46,448 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Backup lines 46,448 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
34Table 4: Measures of Reciprocity
This table presents summary statistics on the four measures of reciprocity at the loan facility
level: (i) reciprocity existence indicates whether the syndicated loan facility shares reciprocity with
another, (ii) reciprocity breadth measures the fraction of reciprocal participants among all participant
lenders, (iii) reciprocity depth measures the average fraction of reciprocal loans taken by the lead
arranger as a participant lender, and (iv) reciprocity length measures the average fraction of the
loan period overlapped with reciprocal loans. Panel A presents detailed statistics on reciprocity that
exists at the time of origination (ex ante only). Panel B compares three types of reciprocity: (1)
reciprocity that exists at the time of origination (ex ante only), (2) total reciprocity, i.e., reciprocity
that exits over the entire sample period (both ex ante and ex post), and (3) reciprocity that exists
not only at origination but also among lead arrangers that have di⁄erent parent companies.
A. Reciprocity at Origination (ex ante only)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Reciprocity existence
Current reciprocity 46,448 0.708 0.455 0 1 1
Past reciprocity 46,448 0.633 0.482 0 1 1
Future reciprocity 46,448 0.015 0.120 0 0 0
Anytime reciprocity 46,448 0.799 0.401 0 1 1
Reciprocity breadth - current
Fraction of reciprocal participants 46,448 0.447 0.370 0 0.5 1
Reciprocity depth - current
Average fraction of reciprocal 42,069 0.085 0.080 0 0.087 0.175
loans taken by the lead arranger
Reciprocity length - current
Average fraction of loan period 46,435 0.457 0.339 0 0.526 0.883
overlapped with reciprocal loans
B. Alternative Measures of Reciprocity
Means on Current Reciprocity
Reciprocity Reciprocity Reciprocity Reciprocity
Existence Breadth Depth Length
1. Reciprocity at origination
(ex ante only) 0.708 0.447 0.085 0.457
2. Total reciprocity
(ex ante & ex post) 0.762 0.530 0.094 0.457
3. Reciprocity at origination
(ex ante only) among 0.696 0.442 0.083 0.449
lead arrangers that have
di⁄erent parent companies
35Table 5: E⁄ect of Reciprocity ￿Bivariate Tests
This table reports results of bivariate tests on the e⁄ect of reciprocity. Panel A compares
means on loan characteristics variables between two sub-samples: syndicated loan facilities with
reciprocity (32,900 facilities) and syndicated loan facilities without reciprocity (13,548 facilities).
Panel B presents bivariate correlation between the four measures of reciprocity (existence, breadth,
depth, and length) and loan characteristics variables. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan
period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at the time of origination for each loan facility. The entire
sample contains 46,448 syndicated loan facilities, of which 11,083 contain the information about the
share the lead arranger retains, 40,577 contain the interest spread on drawn funds, and 5,975 contain
both the interest spread on drawn funds and the upfront fee. Default can be de￿ned for 20,696 loan
facilities (whose borrowers are public ￿rms) during the entire sample period and for 12,563 loan
facilities originated during the years 1992-2001. The standard errors of the mean di⁄erences are in
parentheses in Panel A. * indicates that the mean di⁄erence in Panel A or the correlation coe¢ cient
in Panel B is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the
1% level.
A. Mean Di⁄erences
Loan with vs. without Reciprocity
Total Loans with Loans without Mean
Sample Reciprocity Reciprocity Di⁄erence
Syndicate structure:
% retained by lead arranger 29.50 24.93 46.31 -21.38￿￿￿
(0.425)
Loan pricing:
Spread on drawn funds (bps) 221 202 274 -72￿￿￿
(1.575)
Spread net upfront fee (bps) 173 159 219 -60￿￿￿
(3.580)
Loan default:
Default indicator (full sample) 0.064 0.052 0.110 -0.059￿￿￿
(0.004)
Default indicator (1992-2001) 0.091 0.075 0.141 -0.066￿￿￿
(0.006)
B. Bivariate Correlation
Reciprocity and Loan Characteristics
Reciprocity Reciprocity Reciprocity Reciprocity
Existence Breadth Depth Length
Syndicate structure:
% retained by lead arranger -0.432￿￿￿ -0.120￿￿￿ -0.189￿￿￿ -0.351￿￿￿
Loan pricing:
Spread on drawn funds (bps) -0.222￿￿￿ -0.184￿￿￿ -0.124￿￿￿ -0.241￿￿￿
Spread net upfront fee (bps) -0.210￿￿￿ -0.157￿￿￿ -0.101￿￿￿ -0.224￿￿￿
Loan default:
Default indicator (full sample) -0.097￿￿￿ -0.101￿￿￿ -0.065￿￿￿ -0.103￿￿￿
Default indicator (1992-2001) -0.099￿￿￿ -0.114￿￿￿ -0.077￿￿￿ -0.127￿￿￿
36Table 6: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Syndicate Structure
Regressions of Various Speci￿cations on Reciprocity Existence
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating syndicate structure to the ex-
istence of reciprocity, i.e., whether the syndicated loan facility shares reciprocity with another. The
dependent variable is the share of the loan retained by the lead arranger in percentage, and the inde-
pendent variables include (1) reciprocity, (2) information asymmetry, (3) lead arranger characteristics
including reputation, (4) borrower characteristics including reputation, and (5) loan characteristics.
Columns (I)-(V) vary in the selection of independent variables, ￿xed e⁄ects, and robust standard
errors. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at the
time of origination for each loan facility. All regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate
type, and other speci￿ed ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by speci￿ed
variables are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

























































































































Borrower industry ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes - Yes -
Borrower ￿xed e⁄ects No No Yes No Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects No No No Yes Yes
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Lead Lead Lead Borrower Joint
N = 8,795 8,795 8,802 8,802 8,802
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.670 0.769 0.701 0.783
37Table 7: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Syndicate Structure
Regressions on Various Measures of Reciprocity
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating syndicate structure to reci-
procity shared among syndicated loan facilities. The dependent variable is the share of the loan
retained by the lead arranger in percentage, and the independent variables include (1) reciprocity,
(2) information asymmetry, (3) lead arranger characteristics including reputation, (4) borrower char-
acteristics including reputation, and (5) loan characteristics. Columns (I)-(IV) use each of the four
reciprocity measures (existence, breadth, depth, and length), respectively. Reciprocity is de￿ned
during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at the time of origination for each
loan facility. All regressions include borrower, lead arranger, year, loan purpose, and interest rate
type ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering within borrower-lead groups are in
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

























































































Borrower ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Joint Joint Joint Joint
N = 8,802 8,802 8,366 8,802
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.784 0.786 0.782
38Table 8: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Loan Pricing
Regressions of Various Speci￿cations on Reciprocity Existence
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the existence of
reciprocity, i.e., whether the syndicated loan facility shares reciprocity with another. The dependent
variable is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds in basis points, and the independent
variables include (1) reciprocity, (2) information asymmetry, (3) lead arranger characteristics in-
cluding reputation, (4) borrower characteristics including reputation, and (5) loan characteristics.
Columns (I)-(V) vary in the selection of independent variables, ￿xed e⁄ects, and robust standard
errors. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at the
time of origination for each loan facility. All regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate
type, and other speci￿ed ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by speci￿ed
variables are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

























































































































Borrower industry ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes - Yes -
Borrower ￿xed e⁄ects No No Yes No Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects No No No Yes Yes
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Lead Lead Lead Borrower Joint
N = 26,043 26,043 26,109 26,109 26,109
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.509 0.691 0.555 0.708
39Table 9: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Loan Pricing
Regressions on Various Measures of Reciprocity
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to reciprocity shared
among syndicated loan facilities. The dependent variable is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn
funds in basis points, and the independent variables include (1) reciprocity, (2) information asym-
metry, (3) lead arranger characteristics including reputation, (4) borrower characteristics including
reputation, and (5) loan characteristics. Columns (I)-(IV) use each of the four reciprocity measures
(existence, breadth, depth, and length), respectively. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan
period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at the time of origination for each loan facility. All regressions
include borrower, lead arranger, year, loan purpose, and interest rate type ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust
standard errors allowing for clustering within borrower-lead groups are in parentheses. * indicates
that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level,
and *** at the 1% level.

























































































Borrower ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Joint Joint Joint Joint
N = 26,109 26,109 23,747 26,109
Adjusted R2 0.708 0.708 0.717 0.708
40Table 10: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Loan Default
Regressions of Various Speci￿cations on Reciprocity Existence
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan default to the existence of
reciprocity, i.e., whether the syndicated loan facility shares reciprocity with another. The depen-
dent variable is the loan default indicator, and the independent variables include (1) reciprocity, (2)
information asymmetry, (3) lead arranger characteristics including reputation, (4) borrower charac-
teristics including reputation, and (5) loan characteristics. Columns (I)-(III) report results from OLS
speci￿cations that vary in the selection of independent variables, ￿xed e⁄ects, and robust standard
errors. Columns (IV) and (V) report results from a Probit speci￿cation and a Logit speci￿cation,
respectively. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and at
the time of origination for each loan facility. In order to deal with the right-censoring issue of loan
default, the sample is limited to loan facilities that were originated during years 1992-2001. All
regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate type, and other speci￿ed ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust
standard errors allowing for clustering by speci￿ed variables for the OLS speci￿cations and standard
errors for the Probit and Logit speci￿cations are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated
coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)











Private ￿rm indicator - - - - -


















































































































Borrower industry ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects No No Yes No No
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Lead Lead Borrower - -
N = 9,920 9,920 9,923 9,541 9,541
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.088 0.090 0.131 0.191 0.191
41Table 11: E⁄ect of Reciprocity on Loan Default
Regressions on Various Measures of Reciprocity
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan default to reciprocity shared
among syndicated loan facilities. The dependent variable is the loan default indicator, and the inde-
pendent variables include (1) reciprocity, (2) information asymmetry, (3) lead arranger characteristics
including reputation, (4) borrower characteristics including reputation, and (5) loan characteristics.
Columns (I)-(IV) use each of the four reciprocity measures (existence, breadth, depth, and length),
respectively. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and
at the time of origination for each loan facility. In order to deal with the right-censoring issue of
loan default, the sample is limited to loan facilities that were originated during years 1992-2001.
All regressions include borrower industry, lead arranger, year, loan purpose, and interest rate type
￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering within borrowers are in parentheses. *
indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

































































































Borrower industry ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
S.E. clustered within borrower/lead Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower
N = 9,923 9,923 9,422 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.130 0.130 0.130
42Table 12: E⁄ect of Reciprocity ￿Robustness
This table reports results of robustness tests on the e⁄ect of reciprocity. In all panels, the
dependent variables are the share retained by the lead arranger in Column (I), the interest spread
over LIBOR on drawn funds in Column (II), and the default indicator in Column (III). In order to
deal with the right-censoring issue of loan default, the sample is limited to loan facilities that were
originated during years 1992-2001 for results reported in Column (III). Reciprocity existence is an
independent variable of interest in all panels. Additional independent variables of interest include:
(1) the interaction term of reciprocity existence and information transparency in Panel A, (2) the
interaction terms of reciprocity existence and borrower size in Panel C, (3) the interaction terms
of reciprocity existence and loan size in Panel D, (4) the interaction term of reciprocity existence
and lead arranger reputation in Panel E, and (5) the interaction term of reciprocity existence and
borrower reputation in Panel F. Panel B examines the e⁄ect of reciprocity among two subsamples ￿
borrowers with and without Compustat data, whereas Panels G and H report the results among loans
that were not arranged by the top three lead arrangers (of the year in which the loan was originated)
and loans that were arranged by banks (as opposed to ￿nance companies, institutional investors,
etc.), respectively. Reciprocity is de￿ned during the current loan period (i.e., current reciprocity) and
at the time of origination for each loan facility. Panel I further restricts reciprocity to be among lead
arrangers that have di⁄erent parent companies. A borrower is considered informationally transparent
if it is a public, rated ￿rm. Small, mid-sized, and large borrowers are de￿ned as the smallest, middle,
and largest one-third of borrowing ￿rms in the sample by sales at closing. Similarly, small, mid-sized,
and large loans are de￿ned as the smallest, middle, and largest one-third of loans in the sample by
loan amount. A lead arranger is considered reputable if its previous-year share in the U.S. syndicated
loan market is greater than the median market share, i.e., 1%. A borrower is considered reputable
if it has previously borrowed from the syndicated loan market.
All regressions control for (1) information asymmetry variables (i.e., whether the borrower is a
private ￿rm and whether it is a public, unrated ￿rm), (2) lead arranger characteristics including
reputation (i.e., the lead arranger￿ s previous-year market share in the U.S. syndicated loan market,
the previous-year repeat participant ratio, the bank indicator, and lead arranger ￿xed e⁄ects), (3)
borrower characteristics including reputation (i.e., the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
previous syndicated loan facilities by the borrower and the natural logarithm of sales at closing), (4)
loan characteristics (i.e., the natural logarithm of loan amount, the natural logarithm of maturity
in days, the term loan indicator, indicator variables for the interest rate type and the purpose of the
loan, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of participant lenders in the syndicate, and the
sum of all participant lenders￿previous-year market shares in the global syndicated loan market),
and (5) year ￿xed e⁄ects. For the subsample of loans with Compustat data available for borrowers in
Panel B, additional control variables include the borrower￿ s previous loan default indicator, previous-
year earnings to assets ratio, book leverage ratio, and accruals to assets ratio. Regressions of both
the share retained by the lead arranger and the interest spread on drawn funds [Columns (I) and
(II)] also control for borrower ￿xed e⁄ects, whereas regressions of loan default [Column (III)] control
for the borrower￿ s previous loan default indicator and borrower 2-digit SIC industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, allowing for clustering within borrower-lead groups in
Columns (I) and (II) and within borrowers in Column (III). * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
A. Reciprocity and Information Transparency
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default













N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.708 0.131
43Table 12 (continued)
B. Alternative Information Asymmetry Measures:
Availability of Compustat Data
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default








N = 5,263 12,928 7,660








N = 2,414 10,231 290
Adjusted R2 0.794 0.673 0.613
C. Reciprocity and Borrower Size
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default



















N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.708 0.132
44Table 12 (continued)
D. Reciprocity and Loan Size
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default



















N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.784 0.709 0.131
E. Reciprocity and Lead Arranger Reputation
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default













N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.708 0.131
F. Reciprocity and Borrower Reputation
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default













N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.708 0.131
45Table 12 (continued)
G. Reciprocity and Loans that Were Not
Arranged by the Top Three Lead Arrangers
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default







N = 6,507 18,143 6,788
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.702 0.148
H. Reciprocity and Loans that
Were Arranged by Banks
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default







N = 8,100 22,728 9,291
Adjusted R2 0.788 0.708 0.118
I. Reciprocity among Lead Arrangers
that Have Di⁄erent Parent Companies
(I) (II) (III)
% Retained Spread on Loan Default







N = 8,802 26,109 9,923
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.708 0.132
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